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JUST POLITICS OR FIDELITY TO THE PAST? 
Russell Pannier† 
A Community Built on Words: The Constitution in History and Politics. By 
H. Jefferson Powell. University of Chicago Press, 2002. 251 pages. 
$35.00. 
 H. Jefferson Powell’s book, A Community Built on Words: The 
Constitution in History and Politics, can be read on at least two levels.  
On the one hand, it can be read as an interesting and illuminating 
account of a series of important constitutional issues and debates in 
American legal history.  In this regard, Powell takes up a substantial 
number of issues, including Thomas Jefferson’s 1790 opinion 
concerning the question whether the president or the Senate has 
the power to choose the grade of diplomatic representation the 
United States will use in any particular foreign nation, the dispute 
between Jefferson and Hamilton over the constitutionality of the 
national bank, the conflict between the Federalists and the 
Jeffersonian Republicans over the constitutionality of the Alien and 
Sedition Act, and many others.  On the other hand, the book can 
also be read as an argument for a certain method of constitutional 
interpretation.  I shall focus primarily upon this latter dimension of 
the book. 
Powell begins with a characterization of an account of 
constitutional interpretation he deems popular but mistaken.  He 
does not give it a specific name, but for convenience I shall refer to 
it as the “ideological” account.  This is the view that “the justices of 
the Supreme Court regularly vote in accordance with their 
preferences rather than on the basis of precedent or some other 
supposedly apolitical metric for decision.”1 According to this theory 
of constitutional interpretation, the fundamental explanation for 
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any particular justice’s constitutional interpretations is her or his 
political philosophy.  It is true that members of the Court often 
write opinions that explicitly invoke the constitutional text and the 
alleged historical intentions that support and explain that text, but 
such conventional appeals are nothing but superficial masks for 
underlying ideological agendas.  One way of characterizing this 
account of constitutional interpretation is to say that the 
Constitution is not so much a text, or even a set of principles 
embodied in a text, as it is a set of nine unelected and life-tenured 
persons who have been handed the legal power to impose their 
own political ideologies upon the rest of us.  Alternatively, if one 
prefers to talk in terms of “principles” rather than “persons,” one 
might say that the Constitution is simply whatever set of principles 
of political morality a majority of the Supreme Court happens to 
currently accept. 
Powell concedes the existence of evidence that appears to 
support the “ideological” account.  He acknowledges that “[m]uch 
as many legal scholars dislike admitting it, the evening news is only 
slightly oversimplifying when it talks in terms of liberal and 
conservative wings on the Court.”2  He also agrees that there is a 
sense in which constitutional law is a “thoroughly historical 
phenomenon.”3  As he puts it, “[t]he sort of issues taken seriously, 
the range of views seriously in play on those issues, the relative 
weights of legal argument and policy preferences in the decisions 
of judges and other actors, the extent of consensus and, conversely, 
serious discord on constitutional matters . . . these are all 
demonstrably related to the era about which one is thinking.”4  
Powell observes that this fact that constitutional law appears to be 
historically conditioned causes intellectual anxiety for many: “The 
historicity of constitutional law suggests the possibility that at the 
heart of the Republic, behind the trappings of representative 
democracy and the rule of law, we in fact will find a judicial 
oligarchy ruling great areas of our common life by fiat.”5 
Powell goes on to identify two major alternative responses to 
the “ideological” account.  The first he calls the “fall from virtue” 
theory.6  This is the view that, although contemporary 
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constitutional interpretation is historically conditioned, this need 
not be, and was not always, the case.  There was some particular 
historical point (which point tends to vary with different 
proponents of the view) at which the Court interpreted the 
Constitution on the basis of its “true meaning,” without recourse to 
“contestable political judgments.”7  What we must do is return to 
those “days of virtue” and begin once again to interpret the 
Constitution in accordance with its genuine intent.8  Powell’s 
objection to this theory is that there never were any such days of 
virtue. 
The second response to the “ideological” account is the 
creation of a “sophisticated theory” about constitutional law.9  “At 
various times, including today, constitutional law has gone astray to 
a greater or lesser degree by neglecting its true theory, but that can 
be solved if judges and others will simply heed its principles . . . as 
interpreted by the theorist.”10  I am not certain what sorts of views 
Powell has in mind here, but perhaps he is thinking of proposals to 
interpret the Constitution in some uniform way by invoking one or 
another all-inclusive theoretical principle or set of principles.  For 
example, someone might propose to interpret every provision of 
the Constitution in a way that maximizes economic efficiency, or in 
a way most consistent with the principles of John Rawls, or in a way 
most consistent with the principles of Milton Friedman, or in a way 
most consistent with the best version of social choice theory, and so 
on. 
Powell rejects this second response as well. “The problem with 
this cure is not that it is intellectually bankrupt . . . some of the 
theorists are extraordinarily gifted scholars . . . but that each 
theorist prescribes a different nostrum, and the courts generally 
pay little or no attention to any of them.”11  As with the “fall from 
virtue” theory, this approach is an “evasion, not an explanation, of 
constitutional law’s close connection with political and cultural 
history.”12  Neither response “provides a sure foundation for 
thinking that there is anything to ‘constitutional’ law beyond the 
historical contingencies of changing judiciaries and shifting 
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political climates.”13  Both are “evasions of the history-bound nature 
of American constitutional law.”14 
At this point it is clear that Powell rejects the “ideological” 
account and both of the responses to that account he distinguishes.  
But what precisely is his own account of constitutional 
interpretation?  He calls it the “historicist” interpretation.15  The 
basic claim of this interpretation seems to be that constitutional law 
is an “historically extended tradition of argument, a means 
(indeed, a central means) by which this political society has 
debated an ever-shifting set of political issues.”16  On the one hand, 
Powell asserts that this tradition of argument openly encourages 
legal and political actors to invoke their own personal philosophies 
and ideologies in interpreting the Constitution.  However, on the 
other hand, he claims that this tradition simultaneously imposes a 
“constraint” upon such ideological actors and their ideological 
interpretations.17  The Constitution specifies a normative 
“vocabulary” in whose terms American legal and political actors are 
expected to debate ideological issues: “The formulation of issues, 
the range of considerations that can be considered or at least 
openly acknowledged, even one’s own thinking about which 
political outcomes are best, are shaped by the constraint of fitting 
them within whatever terms and concepts currently are counted as 
constitutional . . . .”18  Powell denies that this constraint upon the 
vocabulary or terms of constitutional debate remains constant over 
time; it changes in unpredictable ways with the shifting ideological 
moods of the Court and the nation.  “Some issues that were 
debatable at an earlier point cease to be arguable . . . .”19  Indeed, 
even the very forms of acceptable constitutional argument 
themselves can, and often do, change in accordance with changes 
in ideological developments.20 
According to Powell, this “historicist” interpretation of 
constitutional law, if generally accepted, would result in a “more 
modest vision” of constitutional interpretation than do “more 
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theoretical” accounts.21  The “historicist” account views 
constitutional interpretation as a “servant” of American politics 
rather than as its “master.”22  It rejects the kind of sharp distinction 
between “law and politics” that many other theories of 
constitutional law offer.23  It “accords more constitutional 
significance to the actions of elected officials and sees less that is 
unique about judicial decisions.”24  If judges were to accept the 
“historicist” approach they would take a “more modest approach to 
their role . . . .”25  On the other hand, if the rest of the nation were 
to accept this approach, then “politicians and citizens alike” would 
have to acknowledge their own “responsibilities in maintaining a 
constitutional order that is open to and inclusive of all.”26 
Powell makes an unusual, but interesting, argument for his 
formulation of the “historicist” account of constitutional law.  
Instead of offering general or abstract arguments for his proposal 
he turns to the examination of a series of constitutional issues and 
debates in American legal and political history in the hope of 
thereby persuading readers that his account of constitutional 
interpretation is the correct account.  In particular he hopes to 
convince readers through historical expositions “that constitutional 
law is thoroughly historical, dependent throughout on the 
contingencies of time and political circumstance, and that it is a 
coherent tradition of argument.”27  What should we make of all 
this?  I shall offer just a few brief comments. 
It seems to me that his characterizations of what he calls the 
“two main responses”28 to the “ideological” account of 
constitutional law are inadequate.  I assume that by the “fall from 
virtue” theories he intends to refer to what are usually described as 
“originalist” theories of constitutional interpretation, that is, 
theories which maintain that the only justifiable methods of 
constitutional interpretation are those that seek to identify and 
articulate the original intended meaning of the constitutional text.  
What I find questionable in Powell’s too brief characterization of 
originalism is his argument that it cannot be correct since there 
 
 21. Id. 
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never were any “days of virtue” in which judges, or anyone else for 
that matter, resolved constitutional issues without making 
“contestable political judgments.”29  Why he thinks that 
sophisticated originalists would be logically committed to the claim 
that there ever was (or ever could be) a time in which anyone 
pursued the project of identifying the intended meaning of the 
constitutional text without making “contestable political 
judgments” is something I fail to understand.  It seems obvious that 
any claim to have correctly ascertained the original intended 
meaning of a constitutional provision is bound to be regarded by 
those who disagree as a “contestable political judgment.”  In short, 
any assertion about constitutional interpretation is inevitably 
“contestable.”  Why would any sane originalist deny that?  Perhaps 
Powell has in mind some narrower understanding of the phrase 
“contestable political judgment.”  If so, it would be nice to have it. 
Powell’s characterization of the second main response to the 
“ideological” account (a “theoretical” account) is even less 
adequate.  He devotes just one brief paragraph to the topic, 
without mentioning any names and without offering any details 
about the nature of the accounts he is targeting.  I assume that the 
typical reader is baffled at this point, lacking even a preliminary 
and sketchy understanding of the sorts of constitutional theories 
Powell rejects and seeks to distinguish from his own. 
This last observation suggests a more general one.  Powell’s 
book addresses an issue (legal interpretation) that has been 
extensively and illuminatingly discussed by many important 
jurisprudential writers.  One immediately thinks of writers such as 
H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and many others.  So far 
as I can see, except for one brief and obscure reference to 
Dworkin,30 there is a total absence of any effort to join issue with 
any of the leading contemporary proponents of theories of legal 
interpretation.  In my view this is a substantial deficiency of the 
book.  Presumably, informed readers would like to know precisely 
how Powell distinguishes his account of legal interpretation from, 
for example, the much discussed account offered by Ronald 
Dworkin, at least for the reason that doing so would help to clarify 
and illuminate Powell’s own theory.  Perhaps Powell thinks that 
theories of legal interpretation propounded by writers such as Hart 
 
 29. Id. at 5. 
 30. Id. at 50. 
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and Dworkin are so clearly misguided that no commentary is 
necessary.  Perhaps he thinks that such alternative theories are 
directed at issues and concerns totally distinct from those he is 
pursuing.  Undoubtedly there are other possible explanations for 
his reticence.  But that reticence, if that is what it is, seems 
unjustifiable.  Why should fair-minded readers not expect at the 
very least some explanation of Powell’s decision to make no effort 
to relate his theory of constitutional law to any of the prominent 
contenders? 
What should we make of Powell’s own account in its own right?  
What exactly does it come to?  I have just noted the difficulty of 
answering that question with any high degree of confidence.  But if 
I had to offer a tentative interpretation I would describe his 
account in two alternative ways.  First, focusing upon constitutional 
law understood as a communal practice, I would say that, for 
Powell, it is a communal practice of debate and argument whose 
vocabulary, concepts, issues, and admissible forms of argument are 
shared by the participants in that practice.  Alternatively, focusing 
upon that part of the work product of this communal practice, 
which at any given time is legally controlling, I would say that for 
Powell the Constitution is a temporal entity whose content, at any 
given historical point, is the set of principles of political morality 
currently adopted by at least five members of the Supreme Court.  
There is a sense in which this communal practice is tied to the past, 
in particular, to the actual document of the Constitution.  But the 
practice has no particular organic temporal continuity, other than 
the brute temporal continuity resulting from the contingent and 
unpredictable historical replacement of one vocabulary and set of 
concepts, issues, and forms of acceptable arguments by such 
vocabulary and the latter, in turn, by another, and so on, 
indefinitely. 
Assuming that I am correct about the nature of his account, 
what should be said?  It seems to me that one of the first things to 
say is that it is unclear whether there is any significant difference 
between Powell’s own theory of constitutional law and the one he 
says he is fundamentally opposing, namely, what I have called the 
“ideological” account.  As we have seen, he criticizes the 
“ideological” account for its failure to take history seriously and for 
its failure to impose any kind of meaningful constraints upon the 
terms and forms of constitutional debate.  The terms and forms of 
the debate are set by whatever ideological passions happen to be in 
7
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legal and political conflict at any particular stage of American 
history. 
But so far as I can see, Powell’s account is susceptible to 
precisely the same complaint.  After all, how difficult can it be for 
competent lawyers to familiarize themselves with the currently 
fashionable constitutional “vocabulary” and the set of currently 
“admissible” concepts, issues, and forms of arguments?  And once 
having familiarized themselves with this current coin of the 
constitutional trade, how difficult can it be to exchange any set of 
philosophical and ideological norms into that coin?  If the 
perceived necessity of so translating one’s own ideological premises 
and conclusions into the terms of the current debate is what Powell 
means by a significant “constraint” upon constitutional 
interpretation then it seems to me that he is mistaken.  In 
particular, it seems that the participants in Powell’s communal 
practice of argument and debate would be no more constrained 
than would be the participants in the communal practice 
contemplated by proponents of the “ideological” account.  For he 
explicitly says that “most contributors to constitutional discussion 
plainly have found that the Constitution, as they understand it, 
generally ordains what they think best and forbids what they fear.”31  
If that is true then it seems pretty clear that there is really no 
genuinely effective constraint upon the process of constitutional 
debate and resolution at all.  Powell’s claim that “history” imposes a 
meaningful constraint looks empty, a mere gesture in the direction 
of American piety for the past for purposes of public consumption. 
In this regard, Powell makes what seems to me a very self-
revealing argument in the course of discussing Justice William 
Paterson’s reluctant conclusion in Calder v. Bull.32 Paterson 
reasoned that the Ex Post Facto clauses are limited to criminal laws,33 
despite the fact that as a member of the Philadelphia Convention 
he had argued vigorously but unsuccessfully that the Ex Post Facto 
prohibition should include civil, as well as criminal, legislation.34  
Powell observes that Paterson’s interpretation of the clauses 
“contradicted what he thought the Constitution should have 
 
 31. Id. at 6. 
 32. 3 U.S. 386, 395 (1798). 
 33. Id. at 397. 
 34. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretative Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
519, 581-82 (2003). 
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provided.”35  But then Powell goes on to try to show how by using 
the very same constitutional vocabulary and acceptable forms of 
argument Paterson could have instead reached the opposite 
conclusion—the very conclusion Paterson preferred on ideological 
grounds.  Powell concludes that there was no good reason why 
Paterson could not have justifiably concluded that “the 
Constitution means what in his view it ought to mean . . . .”36  It 
seems clear from the context that Powell regards Paterson’s 
situation as generalizable to any context calling for constitutional 
interpretation. 
Thus, so far as I can see, Powell is committed to the universal 
proposition that it is always possible for skillful legal rhetoricians to 
manipulate whatever constitutional vocabulary and accepted forms 
of argument happen to be presently in vogue to reach any 
ideological conclusion they desire.  According to this proposition, 
participants in the ongoing constitutional debates are ever willing 
to claim loyalty to historical factors that serve to constrain and limit 
their conclusions, but such claims are really nothing more than a 
facade designed to mislead the public and perhaps even their own 
intellectual consciences.  Of course, given the critical things he says 
about the “ideological” account of constitutional law, Powell would 
not be willing to assert anything even close to the proposition 
expressed by the immediately preceding sentence, but it seems to 
me that such an unwillingness would be unjustifiable even on his 
own grounds.  As has been often noted, the “ideological” account 
of constitutional law has it that judges who purport to “interpret” 
the constitutional text are really just “making it up as they go 
along” on the basis of their own ideological convictions.37  It seems 
to me that Powell’s “historicist” account entails the very same 
conclusion, despite Powell’s apparent belief to the contrary. 
I shall conclude with a few brief comments, without any 
supporting arguments, about the project that I think an adequate 
constitutional theory would undertake.  I agree with one of Powell’s 
basic intuitions, namely, the intuition that “ideological” accounts of 
constitutional law are inadequate.  Of course, there are a great 
 
 35. POWELL, supra note 1, at 46. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making It Up—“Original 
Intent” and Federal Takings Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203 (2003); see also Larry Cata 
Baker, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges, 12 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 123 n.19 (2003). 
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many lawyers, judges, and politicians who act and speak in the way 
described (and prescribed) by the “ideological” account.  In 
addition, so far as I can see, the world of academic law is 
overwhelmingly tilted in favor of “ideological” accounts.  However, 
I do not believe that all the participants in the ongoing process of 
constitutional discussion and debate practice the ideological 
approach.  Thus, to the extent to which “ideological” accounts 
maintain that all such participants adhere to the “ideological” 
account, whether they consciously do so or not, I disagree.  
Further, putting aside the empirical question about the percentage 
of participants who practice the ideological method, I think it 
important to keep in mind the normative question, “What ought to 
be the approach to constitutional interpretation?” 
I also think that proponents of “ideological” accounts are 
typically caught in a type of pragmatic incoherence with respect to 
the relations between the past, present, and future, an incoherence 
which I think is worth exploring.  On the one hand, it seems 
customary for ideological proponents to insist upon the 
desirability, and indeed the necessity, of liberating themselves from 
the past.  In particular, they tend to insist upon the desirability of 
liberating themselves from past communal normative judgments, 
including judgments linguistically expressed in the form of 
constitutional provisions.38  However, on the other hand, it also 
seems obvious that, once allowed to embody their own present 
ideological aims in a legally enforceable form (for example, in 
Supreme Court opinions), such proponents are especially 
concerned that future generations regard themselves as being 
bound by their past, as that past is embodied in the present 
normative judgments of the ideological proponents.  Presumably 
the thought is something like this: “I certainly do not regard myself 
as being morally or legally bound by the past normative judgments 
of my community and it’s completely morally and legally justifiable 
that I do not.  I (and like-minded others) need and deserve 
complete liberation from our communal legal past.  But at the 
same time, I firmly believe that others who come after me are 
morally and legally obligated to regard themselves as morally and 
legally bound by my present normative judgments.  For, my 
judgments are the correct judgments.”  An argument can be 
 
 38. However, I think the same attitude manifests itself even with respect to 
past communal normative judgments as expressed in ordinary statutes. 
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formulated demonstrating the pragmatic incoherence of this line 
of reasoning. 
Finally, I agree with another of Powell’s basic intuitions, the 
thought that an adequate account of constitutional interpretation 
should make room for two apparently conflicting themes—on the 
one hand, the desirability of legal interpreters regarding 
themselves as legally and morally bound by past communal 
normative judgments and, on the other, the desirability of those 
same interpreters acting as more than mere transcribers of past 
collective normative judgments, but also as active agents exercising 
their own normative intuitions and judgments.  In short, the 
challenge is that of formulating a coherent account of legal 
interpretation that somehow synthesizes two apparently disparate 
elements—an attitude of loyalty to the past on the one hand and a 
willingness to presently exercise one’s normative creativity on the 
other.  For the reasons I have indicated, I do not think that Powell 
has managed to successfully carry out this project, but I am 
convinced that the project itself is important, although difficult.  
Part of that difficulty lies in the natural temptation to jettison one 
of these two dimensions in favor of the other.  However, both 
dimensions must be held together in order to render intelligible 
the very concept of a rule of law.  One reason I think a coherent 
synthesis of these two dimensions is possible is the fact that certain 
religious traditions have apparently succeeded in doing just that 
with respect to their own theological and normative pasts.  I suggest 
that it may prove useful to examine such traditions for the purpose 
of explicating and translating their conceptions of religiously 
legitimate interpretation into the context of legal interpretation. 
In my view, any such account of legal interpretation should 
include discussions of at least the following questions.  First, under 
what circumstances, if any, should anyone ever regard oneself as 
bound by the past normative judgments of oneself and one’s own 
legal community?  In other words, why think that one should ever 
be loyal to the past at all, whether to one’s own normative past or to 
one’s own legal community’s normative past?  Second, if there are 
such circumstances, how should one go about exercising that fidelity 
to the past?  That is, what precisely is it to exercise loyalty to past 
normative judgments, whether those judgments were one’s own or 
judgment by one’s legal community? 
I suspect that any even minimally adequate answer to these 
questions will necessarily involve an explication and clarification of 
11
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the concept of a normative principle.  In particular, I think that it will 
necessarily involve a clarification of certain relationships: the 
relationship between normative principles and particular historical 
linguistic formulations of those principles, the relationship 
between normative principles and the subjective states of mind of 
those persons who accept those principles, and the relationship 
between normative principles and their implications, as drawn out 
and articulated by interpreters.  With respect to this last 
relationship, it will be important to draw a systematic distinction 
between drawing out the logical implications of a normative principle 
on the one hand and replacing one normative principle with 
another.  The former activity seemingly can be done while being 
faithful to the past, whereas the latter cannot. 
I also suspect that no adequate explication of the concept of a 
normative principle will be compatible with the traditional 
empiricist posture of reductionism concerning propositions.  
Conceiving of propositions as ontologically reducible to linguistic 
entities, or even to linguistic entities plus individual mental states, 
necessarily precludes any adequate understanding of how 
normative propositions could have a content transcending any 
particular mental act of formulation or interpretation.  I believe 
that it is this transcendence of any particular historical moment 
that makes it possible for normative propositions to provide the 
organic temporal unity necessary for any genuine rule of law. 
My hope is that clarifying and resolving these (and certainly 
other) issues would make it possible to understand a constitution as 
a set of normative principles simultaneously possessing an historical 
origin and a potentially infinite set of normative implications, 
where such implications await being drawn out and clarified by 
legal interpreters simultaneously exhibiting both their fidelity to 
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